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The Case for Dividend Deduction
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH' & AMIR C. CHENCHINSKI"
I. Introduction: The Integration Experiment
The December 2010 compromise between President Barack Obama and the
Republicans extended the 15% tax rate on dividends through the end of
2012.' At that point, however, the rate may revert to the Clinton administra-
tion rate-39.6%-or be raised to 20%-as proposed by the Obama Admin-
istration. 2 Thus, the United States may either abandon corporate-shareholder
integration, maintain partial integration, or perhaps even adopt the George
W Bush administration's 2003 proposal to exempt dividends altogether-as
advocated by some Republicans in Congress.
Given this uncertainty and the likelihood of additional Congressional
action, now may be a good time to revisit the integration issue. Another
reason for revisiting the topic is that several recent proposals would restrict
the deductibility of interest at the corporate level as a way of reducing the
pressure on the distinction between debt and equity, which was also a reason
to adopt partial integration in 2003.3 The President's Economic Recovery
Advisory Board has identified integration as a top policy priority in its report
on options for federal tax reform.'
TIrwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. My thanks to Steve Bank,
Yariv Brauner, Mihir Desai, Victor Fleischer, Pam Olson, Alex Raskolnikov, Dan Shaviro,
Michael Schler, Jeff Trinklein, and the participants in a workshop at Columbia Law School for
their helpful comments.
*Senior Manager, Ernst & Young, Israel; S.J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2004.
This article is based in part on Mr. Chenchinski's S.J.D. dissertation, "The Road Not Yet
Taken: Integration and Dividend Deduction" (Univ. of Mich., 2004) written under the super-
vision of the first author.
'Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 748, 124 Star. 3296.
2 See THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY ADVISORY BOARD, THE REPORT ON TAX
REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 36 (2010)
[hereinafter PERAB REPORT].
'See id. at 72-74; EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REHABILITATING THE
BUSINESS INCOME TAX 10 (2007). For previous critiques that propose limitations of the cor-
porate interest deduction, see William D. Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity and Capital
Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1057, 1057 (1984); Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the
Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk- Taking, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1461,
1508 (1993); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 410, 410-11 (2000); Alvin C. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy
Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1609 (1974).
4PERAB REPORT, supra note 2, at 74-76.
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SECTION OF TAXATION
Traditionally, three reasons have been given to adopt some form of corpo-
rate-shareholder tax integration.' The classical system of corporate taxation,
under which corporate income is subject to tax and dividends are not deduct-
ible and are fully taxable to shareholders, leads to three distortions. First,
there is a bias against operating as a "C" corporation because only C corpo-
rations-typically, publicly traded corporations-are subject to the double
tax. Second, there is a bias against dividend distributions-which trigger the
double tax-and in favor of earnings retention or distributions in the form
of capital gains-which are subject to tax at a lower rate. Third, there is a
bias against equity and in favor of debt because interest is deductible and
dividends are not.
When the Bush Administration proposed to exempt dividends from tax
in 2003, they argued-in accordance with the 1992 Treasury Report-that
such a move would reduce all three distortions.' If the corporate rate and
the individual rate are the same, then for taxable United States shareholders,
a dividend exemption would mean that there is no bias against the corpo-
rate form because income earned through C corporations and income earned
directly or through pass-through entities would be subject to the same rate.
The bias against dividend distributions would be eliminated because divi-
dends would not trigger tax at the shareholder level. Finally, the distinction
between debt and equity would matter less because interest would be taxable
to the recipients of the interest payments while dividends would be taxable at
the same rate at the corporate level.
It is not clear whether the 2003 change, as enacted, achieved any of these
goals. The bias against C corporations remained to the extent that sharehold-
ers are tax exempt because they may bear the burden of the corporate tax but
are not taxed on noncorporate income. The bias against dividends may have
been mitigated, but the data indicates that dividend distributions did not
increase more rapidly after the 2003 change, while redemptions did grow
'See generally id; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAx SYSTEMS, TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1 (1992) [hereinafter 1992
TREASURY REPORT]; ALVIN C. WARREN, AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, INTEGRATION OF INDIVID-
UAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXEs 3 (1993); Alvin C. Warren, The Relation and Integration of
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARv. L. REv. 719, 798 (1981).
"STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX N, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CON-
TAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET PROPOSAL 18 (Comm. Print 2003)
[hereinafter STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N].
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dramatically. Finally, the debt-equity distinction remained in place because
interest could still be deducted and recipients were frequently tax exempt,
while dividends could not be deducted. In the hands of taxable recipients,
therefore, equity was still taxed more heavily than debt even though divi-
dends were subject to a lower rate than interest.
However, proponents of integration would argue that we simply did not
try hard enough in 2003, both because we only partially exempted dividends'
and also because there is a better, more thorough, integration alternative.'
This is the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), first proposed in
the 1992 Treasury Report."
Under the CBIT, all business entities-whether incorporated or not-
are subject to a business level tax at the same rate." Dividends and interest
are both nondeductible but are exempt at the recipient level.1 2 This solu-
tion directly takes care of all three of the biases. First, there is no distinc-
tion between C corporations and other business entities, eliminating the bias
against the corporate form. Second, there is no tax on distributions of any
kind, which eliminates the bias in favor of retention. Finally, since dividends
and interest are both nondeductible, there is no debt-equity distinction.
In recent years, various proposals have built on the CBIT concept. Edward
Kleinbard proposed the Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT). The BEIT
differs from the CBIT primarily because it permits all business entities a
deduction for a Cost of Capital Allowance (COCA) reflecting the "normal"
return on capital, which is taxable at the investor level." Dividends and inter-
est are not deductible or includible under the BEIT."
The Bush Tax Reform Advisory Panel proposed the Growth and Investment
Tax (GIT), a business level cash flow tax under which all capital expenditures
are deductible, as are wages, but dividends and interest are nondeductible but
'See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Redemption Puzzle, 128 TAx NOTES (TA) 853, 853-54 (Sept.
7, 2010). This data does indicate that when there is no tax on a distribution and sharehold-
ers are powerful-e.g, hedge funds-an increase in distributions results. However, this does
not generalize to other shareholders. See Jennifer Blouin, Jana Raedy, & Douglas Shackleford,
Dividends, Share Repurchases, and Tax Clienteles: Evidence fom the 2003 Reductions in Share-
holder Taxes4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16129, 2010) (noting that
while the tax cut did spur some firms to increase dividend payouts, this effect was the greatest
at firms in which corporate directors and officers held large stakes); Jesse Edgerton, Effects of
the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts 16-17 (Fed. Reserve
Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-34, 2010) (noting
that increase in dividends after 2003 tax cut was matched by distributions from REITs, whose
dividends did not qualify for reduced rate, so that tax cut had at most a modest role in driving
increase).
'See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 6.
11992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 39.
'DId
"Id. at 40.
111d. at 39.
U3 KLEINBARD, supra note 3, at 33.
"Id. at 13.
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are subject to a 10% rate at the recipient level." The Obama PERAB propos-
als also envisage applying corporate taxation to a broader class of entities. 16
All of these proposals seek to achieve the same integration goals as the
CBIT, although the GIT goes further by effectively converting the business
tax into a consumption tax or a value added tax (VAT)."
In our view, the problem with all of these proposals is that they omit to ask
the crucial question: Why should we tax business entities in the first place?
Taxes-the economists tell us-are always borne by human beings and not
by legal entities. Why should legal entities, be they corporations or another
form of business entity, be subject to tax at all? Would it not be easier just to
tax people?
It turns out that there are two good reasons to tax some business entities
under some circumstances. Specifically, publicly traded corporations should
be subject to tax. First, it is hard to tax them on a pass-through basis and if
they are not taxed they become vehicles for tax deferral. Second, they are
economically important, and taxing them is a means to regulate the behavior
of the people who run them.
However, if those are the reasons for taxing business entities, then we
believe that the right form of achieving corporate integration is not the CBIT
or its progeny, dividend exemption, or imputation-giving shareholders a
credit for the corporate tax. The right form of integration, we argue, is divi-
dend deduction.
Dividend deduction is frequently mentioned in the literature on integra-
tion but rarely analyzed." In what follows, we will try to explain why divi-
dend deduction is a superior form of integration and resolve some of the
hard questions dividend deduction raises. One such question is why, unlike
dividend exemption and imputation, dividend deduction has not yet been
15PRESIDENT' ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERALTAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICAS TAx SYSTEM 162 (2005).
'
6PERAB REPORT, supra note 2, at 74-76.
"
7 We support a VAT, but in addition to--not as a replacement of-the corporate and
individual income tax. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Designing a Federal VAT Part I:
Summary and Recommendations, 63 TAX L. REv. 285 (2010). Each of these three taxes has a
different goal: The VAT is primarily for raising revenue, the individual income tax is primar-
ily for wealth redistribution, and the corporate tax is primarily for regulation; so, the United
States-like all other OECD countries-needs all three. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation
as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory Taxes 5-6 (Univ.
of Mich. Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
10-020, 2010).
'"It was rejected in both the 1992 Treasury Report and the 1993 ALI Report. See 1992
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5; WARREN, supra note 5. A deduction for dividends on new
equity-but nor other dividends-was proposed in WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY), REPORT-
ER'S STUDY DRAFr 62-63 (1989).
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tried anywhere, as far as we know-although several countries have adopted
a lower rate for distributed than for retained earnings."
II. Two Rationales for Taxing Corporations and Their Implications
Why do we subject business entities to tax? Taxes are borne by human beings,
not legal entities. When we tax legal entities, we create uncertain and shifting
tax burdens. Fifty years of intensive research by economists from Harberger
onward have failed to establish conclusively the economic incidence of the
corporate tax.2 0 In our opinion there are two valid arguments for subjecting
any business entity to tax, but both arguments only apply to publicly traded
corporations.
The first argument relates to deferral. If individuals are subject to tax but
business entities are not and if business entities are treated as separate from
their owners, then it is tempting for individual owners to earn income through
business entities. If income is not subject to tax until it is distributed, then the
owners achieve deferral of the tax which-given the time value of money-is
tantamount to a reduction in the effective tax rate.
This argument does not hold, however, if we can look through a business
entity and tax its owners directly on the income earned by the entity. In the
case of business entities that are not publicly traded, this is relatively easy. In
fact, we apply pass-through taxation to the vast majority of such entities-
sole proprietorships, partnerships, LLCs, and S corporations.2' In cases where
we do not apply pass-through taxation-closely held C corporations, trusts
and decedents' estates-there is, in our opinion, no good reason not to apply
pass-through taxation.22
However, publicly traded corporations are hard to tax on a pass-through
basis because the shares change hands constantly and the identity of the
shareholders may be difficult to determine. Because of these problems, pass-
through or complete integration is generally not considered a feasible alterna-
tive for publicly traded business entities-corporations and publicly traded
"'See PETER HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND ALLOCATING TAX-
INc RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES 95-96 (1996). 'The Czech Republic and pre-2001 Germany
are two examples.
21See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, TAx POLICY CENTER, URBAN INSTITUTE AND BROOK-
INGS INSTITUTION, CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRESSrVITY
1-2 (2009) (discussing the lack of consensus regarding the incidence of the corporate income
tax).
2 1See I.R.C. § 1363 (stating that an S Corporation will not be taxed as a C corporation);
Reg. 5 301.7701-3 (allowing pass-through taxation for entities with a single owner, limited
liability companies, and partnerships).
22We would treat closely held C corporations as mandatory elected S corporations, treat
nongrantor trusts as simple trusts-i.e., tax the beneficiaries currently-or impose an interest
charge on distributions to beneficiaries of complex trusts, and abolish the estate tax and replace
it with a tax on heirs. See Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expectfrom Heirs?A Proposal
for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax 3-7 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Org., Working Paper
No. 08-42, 2008).
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partnerships, which we treat as C corporations for this reason.23
Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible to solve the deferral problem-even
for publicly traded business entities-without imposing an entity level tax.
The solution would be to treat them as if they were Passive Foreign Investment
Companies (PFICs): Tax shareholders on a current basis-with an election
by the entity to let the shareholders know how much income is attributable
to them-upon distribution with an interest charge or on a mark-to-market
basis. The problem is that all of these alternatives would be quite unpopular
politically. In particular, although the mark-to-market alternative is attrac-
tive because there is no liquidity or valuation issue for publicly traded stock
by definition, given the recent vagaries of the stock market, the problem of
phantom income for shareholders and revenue instability for governments is
likely to doom any such proposal. Because of this, we believe that entity level
taxation is needed for publicly traded business entities to address the deferral
issue.
The second argument in favor of taxing publicly traded business entities
relates to regulation. Publicly traded C corporations are very important play-
ers in the economy, and their managers make decisions that affect the lives of
millions of citizens. Not surprisingly, Congress has opted to use the corporate
tax as a vehicle to regulate the activities of corporate managers by rewarding
activities it likes-for example, investment tax credits and expensing-and
punishing activities it dislikes-such as tax rules related to boycotts, bribes,
and penalties.24 In our opinion, this is the strongest reason to have a corporate
tax and the one that was foremost in Congress's mind-both when it enacted
the tax a century ago and during its maintenance today.25
Once again, this reason only applies to publicly traded business entities
because as a practical matter, most large business entities need to access the
equity markets and therefore become publicly traded C corporations. There
are very few large privately held businesses in the United States. In such cases,
the regulatory aims could be achieved by taxing the controlling shareholders
directly because they are also the managers. 26
If these are the two reasons to tax business entities, then our current system
gets it approximately right-it generally applies the corporate tax only to
publicly traded entities but not to privately held ones. Therefore, the various
proposals to extend entity level taxation to privately held entities-such as
the CBIT, the BEIT, and the GIT-are misguided.
However, this conclusion leaves open the question of integration. Is there
23 See I.R.C. § 7704 (a) ("[A] publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a corpora-
tion.").
24SeeI.R.C. § 48 (investment tax credit); I.R.C. § 162(a) (deductions for business expenses);
I.R.C. § 162(c)(3) (disallowing deduction for kickbacks or bribes); I.R.C. § 162(e) (disallow-
ing deduction for lobbying costs).
25See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2004).
26See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1203.
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a way to mitigate the three biases in the classical system without adopting the
CBIT or its progeny? We argue that the answer is to adopt dividend deduc-
tion. This method of integration satisfies the two goals of taxing business
entities and addresses the three biases adequately--or at least addresses the
biases better than dividend exemption or imputation.
Before we go into the details of the dividend deduction proposal and com-
pare it to other integration methods, we explain its superiority to the other
proposals in achieving the two goals of taxing business entities. First, unlike
the CBIT and its progeny, it is not overbroad because it only applies to pub-
licly traded C corporations. Second, it directly addresses the deferral issue
because, by definition, if a corporation distributes a dividend there is no defer-
ral and no need to tax that income at the corporate level. Dividend exemption
and imputation, as well as the CBIT and its progeny, continue to tax income
at the corporate level even when it is distributed-which is inconsistent with
the anti-deferral rationale for the corporate tax.27 Third, dividend deduction
meets the regulatory goal of corporate taxation because once management
decides to distribute a dividend, it does not control the funds any longer and
there is no need to impose a corporate level tax in order to regulate the entity's
use of the funds. 28 Again, the CBIT and its progeny, dividend exemption,
and imputation overtax corporate managers by continuing to tax corporate
income even when it has been distributed to shareholders. 29
III. The Dividend Deduction Proposal
Therefore, the proposal is to allow corporations an unlimited deduction for
both dividends and interest.30 The corporate tax will only apply to retained
earnings.
27Id. at 1201-05.
28See id. at 1246-48 (discussing the regulatory rationale for the corporate tax).
29Arguably, this line of thought indicates that the definition of dividend should be expanded
to cover any corporate distribution to shareholders, eliminating the "earnings and profits" limi-
tation-as is done in other countries like the UK. See William D. Andrews, "Out ofIts Earnings
and Profits"- Some Reflections on the Taxation ofDividends, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1403, 1403 (1956)
(discussing how the "earnings and profits" requirement of distribution taxation has outlived
its usefulness). But, this would raise a concern that corporations would borrow to distribute
dividends and deduct both the interest and dividends. On the recipient side, both dividends
and interest should be fully taxable to shareholders, and if dividend deduction is adopted, there
is no need for a reduced rate for dividends or for redemptions-except that both should be
eligible for recovery of basis. Regular capital gains on sales of stock should be fully taxable for
controlling shareholders-including corporate shareholders-but tax-free to portfolio share-
holders because the portfolio capital gains of foreign shareholders cannot be taxed.
3oAs discussed below, it may be necessary to apply the earnings stripping limitations of sec-
tion 163(j) to dividends to foreign parents, as well as to interest.
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Both dividends and interest will be taxable at the recipient level." If the
recipient is a United States taxable individual or corporation, the result would
be one level of tax at the recipient level at graduated rates, with no dividend
received deduction for corporations-although dividends would still be elim-
inated in a consolidated group. This result maintains progressivity because if
the shareholder rate is higher than the corporate rate, the shareholder rate
applies.32 This is not true in the CBIT or with a dividend exemption because
those methods only apply the corporate level tax.33 Imputation and the BEIT
also maintain progressivity. 4
The hard issue for a dividend deduction system is what to do when the
recipient is (1) a lower-bracket United States individual, (2) a tax-exempt
United States institution, or (3) a foreigner. In the case of a lower-bracket
domestic recipient, there is no reason to tax her at a higher rate, and a divi-
dend deduction achieves the correct tax result from a progressivity perspec-
tive. There is no reason why lower-bracket individuals should be taxed at a
35% rate merely because they earn their income through a C corporation
rather than directly.
In our opinion, the same analysis applies to tax-exempt domestic institu-
tions. If we believe that these institutions truly should be exempt, we should
not indirectly tax them at a 35% tax rate if they invest in a C corporation.
This change will be expensive, given that over 50% of United States equities
are held by tax-exempt entities, but Congress could make dividends and
interest from C corporations to tax-exempt entities taxable under the unre-
lated business income tax (UBIT).36
Foreign recipients are probably the main reason why no country has
adopted dividend deduction-just as foreign recipients are the main reason
why countries have shifted from imputation to dividend exemption once the
pressures of globalization and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law
meant that countries would have to extend imputation credits to foreigners.
31We would also support treating dividends and redemptions alike by (1) allowing a deduc-
tion for redemptions and (2) allowing basis recovery for both dividends and redemptions. The
same rules would apply to redemptions from foreign shareholders. See Avi-Yonah, supra note
7, at 855; Ethan Yale, Corporate Distribution Tax Reform: Exploring the Alternatives, 29 VA. TAX
REV. 329, 335-37 (2009).
31See WARREN, supra note 5.
33Id.
'See 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 39, 95-96; KLEINBARD, supra note 3, at
19.
35JASON M. THOMAS, PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF H.R. 4213 ON PRIVATE
EQuITy INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 8 (2010), available at http://www.pegcc.org/word-
press/wp-content/uploads/Tax-Exempt-Study-06-08-10.pdf.
"See H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 240 (1985) (adopting dividend deduction and treating a
portion of dividends as taxable under the UBIT).
37Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Convergence and Globalization 4-5 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 214, 2010), available at http://
www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/elsc/abstracts/2010/Documents/10-019aviyonah.
pdf
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No country likes to lose its corporate tax base to foreign recipients. And yet,
to a large extent, countries have accepted a loss to their corporate tax base
when they allow interest to be deductible and not subject to a withholding
tax, even when paid to recipients in tax havens.18 Thus, we do not see foreign
shareholders as a reason not to adopt dividend deduction, because at least
dividends paid to foreign shareholders are subject to one level of taxation in
most cases-30% if there is no treaty, 15% if there is a treaty, and 5% in most
cases for direct dividends to foreign parents." In fact, Congress has recently
strengthened the dividend withholding tax against abuse by means of deriva-
tives while leaving interest withholding--or lack thereof-unchanged.40
If the United States adopts dividend deduction, we could reconsider our
treaty policy. Given dividend deductibility, we could impose a 30% tax on all
outgoing dividends without creating a higher barrier to foreign investment
than is posed by the current corporate tax. But even if we do nothing, we
do not see foreign shareholders as a reason not to adopt dividend deduction
given that we allow interest and royalty deductions without a withholding
tax.41 In the absence of higher dividend withholding, we would, however,
support applying the limits of Code section 163(j) to dividends as well as to
interest, especially since some dividends to foreign parent corporations are
now subject to no withholding under our treaties. 42
IV. Comparing Dividend Deduction, Dividend Exemption,
Imputation, and the CBIT
How does dividend deduction compare with the other integration methods
as a way of addressing the three biases?
In terms of the bias against the corporate form, we argue that dividend
deduction is as good as dividend exemption or imputation. In all three cases,
there is only one level of tax imposed-at the shareholder level for dividend
deduction or imputation and at the corporate level for dividend exemption.
If the top shareholder tax rate is higher than the corporate tax rate, then
both imputation and dividend deduction are superior to dividend exemption
because with dividend exemption, noncorporate investments are taxed at a
higher rate than corporate ones. Therefore, the bias is reversed.
One special case that should be mentioned is corporate level preferences.
"Thin capitalization rules are the only bulwark against complete erosion of the corporate
tax base in this instance. See Stuart Webber, Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction Regula-
tions, 60 TAX NOTES INT L (TA) 683 (Nov. 29, 2010).
3
'Seejobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 235 (1985). However, the rate may vary by treaty.
4 See I.R.C. § 871(m). As noted above, Congress should also tax redemptions by foreign
and domestic shareholders and allow basis recovery for both.
4'I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (allowing deduction for royalties); I.R.C. § 163(a) (allowing deduction
for interest).
42In the case of branches, we would also support applying the rules of section 884(f)-which
treats branches as subsidiaries for purposes of interest deductions-to dividends as well.
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Most commentators agree that corporate preferences that reduce the corporate
rate below 35% should not be passed through to shareholders because-in
accordance with the regulatory goal of the corporate tax-they are intended
to influence management behavior and not to benefit shareholders.43 But
with both dividend exemption and dividend imputation, it is necessary to
construct very complicated mechanisms to prevent corporate preferences
from being passed on to shareholders. In the case of dividend deduction, this
happens automatically because if there is no corporate income, the deduction
disappears."
The CBIT and its progeny do a better job of eliminating the bias against
the corporate form than dividend exemption or imputation because both of
those methods leave the corporate tax completely intact but apply it only to
publicly traded C corporations. Dividend deduction reduces the bias because
the corporate tax only applies to retained earnings but does not eliminate the
bias as thoroughly as the CBIT and its progeny. However, we argue that the
CBIT and its progeny tax nonpublic business entities unnecessarily, for the
reasons stated above.
In addition, for three reasons, we are not sure this bias is very important.
First, the empirical literature suggests that the bias is not very large.45 Sec-
ond, to see a bias against the corporate form, one needs to assume that the
corporate tax falls on shareholders, which is a doubtful proposition." If the
corporate tax is shifted to labor, consumers, or both, then there is in fact a
bias in favor of corporations because the dividend tax can be deferred whereas
owners of pass-through entities are taxed currently. Third, it is not clear that
publicly traded entities are substitutes for private business entities. There may
"See WARREN, supra note 5; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate Preference
Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis, 44 TAx LAw. 195, 195 (1990).
"For the complexities of preventing pass-through of preferences under dividend exemption
see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 93 (Comm. Print 2003), and for the complexities under
imputation see Avi-Yonah, supra note 43.
"Most estimates of the deadweight loss (DWL) from this bias are quite low. See, e.g., Austan
Goolsbee, The Impact and Inefficiency of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence From State Orga-
nizational Form Data 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9141, 2002)
("An increase in the corporate tax rate by 10 percent reduces the corporate share of firms by
5-10 percent and the corporate share of sales and employment by 2-6 percent."). Goolsbee
concludes that "[t]he impact of tax rates is an order of magnitude larger than previous esti-
mates . . . and suggests a larger DWL from corporate taxation, but is still relatively modest."
As Goolsbee says, previous studies found much lower DWLs. See also Austan Goolsbee, Taxes,
Organizational Form, and The Dead Weight Loss Of The Corporate Income Tax 7 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6173, 1997) ("The results indicate that taxes do mat-
ter for organizational form decisions but the magnitude of the effect is small. An increase in
the corporate rate of .10 raises the noncorporate share of capital between .2 and 3 percentage
points. At this magnitude, the dead weight loss of the corporate income tax is less than 10%
of revenue.").
"See HARRIs, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing indicators that some of the corporate tax is
borne by the labor force).
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be compelling nontax reasons to access the public equity markets that over-
come any tax bias.
The bias against retention is only partially addressed by dividend exemption
and imputation because distribution decisions are made by managers who
may not care very much about the shareholder tax. There is little evidence
that the 2003 dividend exemption rules increased dividend distributions."
Dividend deduction, we argue, would create a very powerful incentive for
management to distribute earnings. In countries where there was a rate dif-
ferential between retained and distributed earnings, dividend exemption is an
effective way of encouraging distributions." The CBIT and its progeny are
also inferior to dividend deduction as a tool for incentivizing management
because they exempt distributions at the recipient level. We believe that in
many cases, this is not as good a way of encouraging distributions as allowing
a full deduction at the corporate level.
Finally, neither imputation nor dividend exemption does a good job at
addressing the bias against equity and in favor of debt because both tax divi-
dends at the corporate level and interest at the investor level. 0 This creates
debt-equity parity only when both the rates are the same and the recipients of
interest payments are fully taxable-which is rarely the case. Dividend deduc-
tion, on the other hand, creates true debt-equity parity.5
The CBIT and its progeny also create debt-equity parity but at a heavy
price-they disallow the deduction for interest even though interest is a legit-
imate cost of doing business.52 For financial institutions in particular, it seems
very inappropriate in an income tax context to disallow the interest deduction
and effectively tax the institutions on gross interest income. Dividend deduc-
tion achieves the same goal but without the inappropriate limits on interest
deductions. The BEIT also achieves this goal through the COCA deduction,
but this assumes that we can get COCA right and that it would adequately
compensate for the loss of both interest and depreciation deductions."
"See 1992 TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
"See Avi-Yonah, supra note 7, at 853.
"See HARms, supra note 20, at 10. The case of RICs and REITs in the United States is
another illustration, since they distribute almost all of their income. See Edgerton, supra note
7, at 10. We do not anticipate a similar response from C corporations since unlike RICs and
REITs, they will have to retain funds to run the business operations and will not have the
option of declaring a dividend without an actual distribution.
"oSee 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 105.
"Even under dividend deduction, debt to equity parity is incomplete because interest is
deductible when it accrues while dividends are deductible only when paid, but we doubt this
makes a big difference except for OID instruments. We could extend the OID rules to equity
under section 305, but we doubt this is a good idea. It will enable corporations to obtain the
benefit of the deduction without paying out an actual dividend, while the recipients-like
holders of OID debt-are likely to be tax exempt. See id. at 107.
52See id at 39.
53 See Alvin C. Warren, Another BEIT at the Apple: Warren Replies to Kleinbard, 118 TAx
NOTES (TA) 1254 (Mar. 17, 2008).
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To sum up, we believe that dividend deduction is superior to both impu-
tation and dividend exemption at addressing the second and third biases in
favor of retentions and debt. Dividend deduction is also superior to the CBIT
and its progeny on the bias in favor of retentions and is equal to it on the
debt-equity issue but without the CBIT's inappropriate limitations on inter-
est deductibility. Dividend deduction is also as good as imputation and better
than dividend exemption on the first bias in favor of noncorporate businesses.
It is not as good as the CBIT and its progeny on this front, but this seems
a small price to pay in exchange for avoiding a dramatic and, in our view,
unnecessary expansion of entity taxation.
V. Conclusion
Now that we have two years to consider whether the United States should
revert to the classical system of taxing corporations and their shareholders, it
is a good time to reflect on the United States integration experience. We do
not see much evidence that adopting a partial dividend exemption in 2003
had a significant effect on the three biases that are usually cited to support
integration.
However, this does not mean that the United States should reject integra-
tion-although integration is certainly not essential. Most of the world has
integration, and the United States should reconsider it as well. If it does, we
do not believe that the United States needs to adopt a radical expansion of the
taxation of business entities-as envisaged by the CBIT and its progeny-
especially if this requires eliminating interest deductibility. Nor do we think
the United States needs to reinstate shareholder level integration mechanisms
that benefit the rich disproportionately-dividend exemption--or are very
complex-imputation. Instead, like the original version of tax reform did in
1985, the United States should try dividend deduction as a relatively simple
way of achieving integration that is also the most consistent with the two
reasons it needs to tax publicly traded corporations in the first place.
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